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Mallory
Malware3 associated CVEs

MyDriver.sys

Tracked since Jan 5, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK2Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

MyDriver.sys is an unsigned Windows kernel driver used as part of the MAESTRO VMware ESXi VM-escape exploit toolkit observed by Huntress in a December 2025 intrusion. The driver was loaded via kdu.exe to bypass Driver Signature Enforcement and was embedded as a resource within the MAESTRO orchestrator alongside kdu.exe, devcon.exe, and drv64.dll. Huntress described it as an unsigned kernel driver containing the VM escape exploit.

Operationally, the toolkit used devcon.exe to disable VMware VMCI-related devices (PCI\VEN_15AD&DEV_0740 and ROOT\VMWVMCIHOSTDEV), after which MyDriver.sys communicated directly with VMCI hardware registers using x86 IN/OUT instructions to avoid contention with vmci.sys. The driver queried the ESXi host version using the VMware Guest SDK command "guestlib.stat.get text session" and parsed the ESXi build string. The exploit supported 155 ESXi builds spanning versions 5.1 through 8.0 using build-specific offsets.

Based on Huntress’s assessment, the broader exploit chain likely leveraged VMware vulnerabilities CVE-2025-22226, CVE-2025-22224, and CVE-2025-22225 from VMSA-2025-0004. The chain used HGFS drag-and-drop related RPC commands to leak VMX memory and defeat ASLR, corrupted VMX memory via VMCI, and then escaped the VMX sandbox to the ESXi kernel. It wrote stage-1 and stage-2 shellcode plus the Linux ELF backdoor VSOCKpuppet into VMX memory, ultimately deploying the backdoor on the ESXi host. VSOCKpuppet bound to VSOCK port 10000 and supported file read/write and arbitrary shell command execution via /bin/sh. A Windows VSOCK client (client.exe, also called "GetShell Plugin") was used from a guest VM to communicate with the ESXi backdoor.

The malware was associated with an intrusion that likely began through a compromised SonicWall VPN, followed by lateral movement using a compromised Domain Admin account, RDP access to domain controllers, share enumeration with ShareFinder, attempted password changes via Impacket, and firewall modifications to block outbound external connectivity while preserving internal RFC1918 access. Huntress noted simplified Chinese development artifacts and PDB evidence suggesting development as early as February 19, 2024, indicating a well-resourced developer likely operating in a Chinese-speaking region, though no specific threat actor attribution was provided. The intrusion was stopped before it culminated in ransomware.

Known IOC directly associated with MyDriver.sys: SHA-256 2bc5d02774ac1778be22cace51f9e35fe7b53378f8d70143bf646b68d2c0f94c.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-22225via bleeping computerExploited in the wildVMware ESXi VMX Sandbox Escape via Arbitrary Kernel WriteCVE-2025-22225 (8.2 severity score): An arbitrary write vulnerability in ESXi that allows escaping the VMX sandbox to the kernelView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-22226via bleeping computerExploited in the wildVMware HGFS Out-of-Bounds Read and VMX Memory DisclosureOf the three bugs, only one received a critical severity score: CVE-2025-22226 (7.1 severity score): An out-of-bounds read in HGFS that allows leaking memory from the VMX processView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-22224via bleeping computerExploited in the wildVMCI TOCTOU Code Execution in VMware ESXi and WorkstationCVE-2025-22224 (9.3 severity score): A TOCTOU vulnerability in Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) leading to an out-of-bounds write, allowing code execution as the VMX processView vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"Huntress assesses that initial access likely came through a compromised SonicWall VPN."

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

"...likely exploited three VMware vulnerabilities disclosed as zero-days in March 2025..."

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping2Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.