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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
A Turkish-speaking threat actor is exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a WinRAR vulnerability that abuses NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) with path traversal, to deliver a sophisticated Python-based Telegram RAT to victims in Turkey and Germany.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
updater.exe ... The outer stage specifically looks for: RuntimeBroker.exe ... XOR decode local payload from .data ... NtWriteVirtualMemory(remote, decoded_shellcode) ... NtCreateThreadEx(remote_base) ... After XOR + LZNT1 decompression, we get the final PE payload.
updater.exe ... The outer stage specifically looks for: RuntimeBroker.exe ... XOR decode local payload from .data ... NtWriteVirtualMemory(remote, decoded_shellcode) ... NtCreateThreadEx(remote_base) ... After XOR + LZNT1 decompression, we get the final PE payload.
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Right after that, the script establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task named: OneDriveUpdater The task runs in the user context and starts the dropped executable every ten minutes.
PyArmour-obfuscated Pyinstaller backdoor that can execute shell commands, collect system information, and dynamically load additional Python modules
Through the initial remote session, STAC4749 operators launched PowerShell on the compromised system to retrieve and execute malicious payloads hosted on attacker-controlled web servers.
The loader resolves NTDLL exports by CRC32 hash and then extracts the syscall numbers from the NTDLL stubs. Resolved functions include: NtOpenProcess NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtWriteVirtualMemory NtProtectVirtualMemory NtCreateThreadEx NtWaitForSingleObject
Right after that, the script establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task named: OneDriveUpdater The task runs in the user context and starts the dropped executable every ten minutes.
The second package is: XOR encrypted LZNT1 compressed The stage uses RtlDecompressBuffer with compression format 0x2 , which means LZNT1.
The file is stored locally as: %LOCALAPPDATA%\OneDriveUpdater\OneDriveUpdater.exe This is a simple masquerading trick: a file that looks like a text file on the server is downloaded and immediately written as an executable on disk.
The outer stage specifically looks for: RuntimeBroker.exe The flow is roughly: NtOpenProcess(RuntimeBroker.exe) NtAllocateVirtualMemory(remote, size=0x19321, PAGE_READWRITE) ... NtWriteVirtualMemory(remote, decoded_shellcode) ... NtCreateThreadEx(remote_base)
queries the registry at “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Window NT\CurrentVersion” for the following values
encrypts the data with the hard-coded XOR key “Moz&Wie;#t/6T!2y," prepends the encrypted data with “GIF89a” (image header)
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.