ColdRiver Deploys New Malware Backdoors After Exposure of LOSTKEYS Platform
Threat Actor Intelligence · 10 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Oct 21, 2025

The Russia-backed advanced persistent threat group ColdRiver, also known as UNC4057, Star Blizzard, and Callisto, has launched a new cyber espionage campaign targeting NATO governments, former diplomats, policy advisors, and high-profile NGO figures. Following the public disclosure of their LOSTKEYS credential-stealing malware by Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) in May 2025, ColdRiver rapidly abandoned LOSTKEYS and pivoted to deploying a new suite of malware tools. Within five days of the LOSTKEYS exposure, the group had ceased all observed use of the platform and began leveraging new backdoors, including YESROBOT and MAYBEROBOT, distributed via a loader called NOROBOT. The initial infection vector in these campaigns involves a ClickFix CAPTCHA-style lure, which tricks users into executing a malicious file, thereby initiating the malware deployment process. The YESROBOT backdoor, written in Python, was first observed in late May 2025 and required a full Python 3.8 installation, with its decryption key split across multiple components as an anti-analysis measure. However, YESROBOT was considered cumbersome due to its operational requirements and limited extensibility. By early June 2025, ColdRiver had shifted to using MAYBEROBOT, a more streamlined PowerShell-based backdoor capable of downloading and executing content from a hardcoded command-and-control server, running commands via cmd.exe, and executing PowerShell blocks. The group continued to iterate on both NOROBOT and MAYBEROBOT throughout the summer, regularly rotating command-and-control infrastructure to evade detection. This rapid development and operational tempo highlight ColdRiver’s ability to adapt quickly when their tools are exposed. The campaigns demonstrate a shift from credential phishing without malware to the deployment of lightweight, modular backdoors, increasing the sophistication and persistence of their operations. Despite their technical agility, ColdRiver has experienced repeated operational security failures, which have allowed researchers to track their activities closely. The use of fake CAPTCHA lures and DLL execution via rundll32 marks a tactical evolution from previous PowerShell-based delivery methods. The group’s targets remain consistent, focusing on entities of strategic interest to Russian intelligence. GTIG’s ongoing monitoring has not observed any further use of LOSTKEYS since its exposure, confirming the group’s complete transition to the new malware suite. The campaigns underscore the importance of rapid threat intelligence sharing and the need for organizations to remain vigilant against evolving social engineering and malware delivery techniques. ColdRiver’s activities exemplify the persistent threat posed by state-sponsored actors capable of quickly retooling their operations in response to public disclosures. Organizations in the crosshairs of such groups should prioritize detection of novel malware loaders, backdoors, and social engineering lures, as well as maintain robust incident response capabilities.


