Threat researchers reported several unrelated RAT-focused malware campaigns using different delivery channels and evasion techniques. DEAD#VAX was described as a Windows phishing operation that delivers AsyncRAT via purchase-order lures, abusing IPFS-hosted VHD files disguised as PDFs; the mounted VHD drops a multi-stage chain using WSF, heavily obfuscated batch scripts, and PowerShell loaders to decrypt and execute x64 shellcode in memory by injecting into trusted Windows processes, minimizing on-disk artifacts. Separately, analysis of Pulsar RAT activity described persistence via the per-user Run key (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run), an obfuscated batch dropper in AppData, PowerShell-based staging, and Donut-generated shellcode injection into processes such as explorer.exe, with anti-analysis features and data theft (credentials, wallets, tokens) exfiltrated via Discord webhooks.
On Android, two distinct campaigns were highlighted. Anatsa banking malware was found distributed through Google Play in a trojanized “document reader” app that exceeded 50,000 downloads before detection; the initial app acts as a loader that retrieves the full banking trojan and supports credential theft and C2-driven actions, with reporting attributing discovery and tracking to Zscaler ThreatLabz. Arsink RAT was reported spreading primarily via Telegram/Discord and file-sharing sites (e.g., MediaFire) through fake “mod/pro” apps impersonating major brands; research attributed to Zimperium cited ~45,000 victim IPs across 143 countries, 1,216 malicious APKs, and 317 Firebase Realtime Database C2 endpoints, with capabilities including SMS/OTP theft, call log and contact harvesting, location tracking, and microphone audio capture.

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Threat hunters revealed the DEAD#VAX campaign, which used phishing emails with IPFS-hosted VHD files disguised as PDF purchase orders to infect Windows users. The multi-stage chain relied on obfuscated scripts, in-memory shellcode execution, process injection into Microsoft-signed binaries, and scheduled-task persistence to deploy AsyncRAT while avoiding traditional detection.
Researchers found Anatsa banking malware being distributed through a seemingly benign document reader app on Google Play, where it accumulated more than 50,000 downloads before detection. The app acted as an installer that later fetched the full banking trojan, which used overlays and credential logging to steal banking data and session tokens.
Analysts reported a new wave of Windows attacks using Pulsar RAT, which persists via the per-user Run registry key and uses PowerShell-based, in-memory execution to evade detection. The malware injects into legitimate processes, steals credentials and other sensitive data, and exfiltrates ZIP-compressed data through Discord webhooks and Telegram bots.
Over several months before February 2026, Arsink RAT spread through social engineering on Telegram, Discord, and file-sharing sites while masquerading as modified versions of popular apps. Zimperium identified 45,000 unique victim IPs in 143 countries, 1,216 malicious APKs, and 317 Firebase Realtime Database command-and-control endpoints tied to the campaign.
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