Huntress reported an intrusion in which a threat actor used stolen SSLVPN credentials to access a partner environment through a FortiGate from 45.153.34[.]132, then moved laterally with a customized Impacket smbexec.py workflow to a workstation and enabled RDP. After Microsoft Defender blocked a registry-hive dumping attempt as Behavior:Win32/RegDump.SA, the operator shifted from SMB-based execution to an interactive RDP session from VPN-assigned IP 10.212.134[.]200.
The attacker then installed the open-source Komari monitoring agent from raw.githubusercontent[.]com as a SYSTEM service named "Windows Update Service", using NSSM for persistence and embedding the C2 server and bearer token in service parameters. Huntress said Komari's normal feature set effectively provides command-and-control by default, including arbitrary command execution, interactive terminal access, network probing, and a persistent WebSocket channel; responders isolated affected devices, disabled the compromised account, and cut off the WebSocket connection before the actor issued follow-on commands through the tool.

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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On 2026-04-16, Huntress published its report assessing Komari as effectively functioning as command-and-control by default because it supports arbitrary command execution, interactive terminal access, and network probing over persistent WebSocket connections.
Huntress isolated affected devices in the partner environment, disabled the compromised user account, and severed the persistence/WebSocket connection before the operator issued any follow-on exec or terminal commands through Komari.
The attacker configured Komari persistence using NSSM and hardcoded the command server and bearer token into service parameters, establishing a long-lived outbound WebSocket channel that would provide SYSTEM-level remote access.
Following the Defender detection, the operator moved to an interactive RDP session and installed the open-source Komari monitoring agent from raw.githubusercontent[.]com as a SYSTEM-level service named "Windows Update Service."
During the intrusion, Microsoft Defender quarantined a registry hive dumping artifact and detected it as Behavior:Win32/RegDump.SA, interrupting the attacker's initial activity.
After gaining access, the attacker used a customized Impacket smbexec.py workflow over SMB to pivot to a workstation and enable Remote Desktop Protocol access.
On 2026-04-16, a threat actor used stolen SSLVPN credentials for a user to access a partner environment through a FortiGate device from IP address 45.153.34[.]132.
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