Loading story…
A malware campaign is distributing AtlasRAT through a fake Flash Player installer named FlashPlay.Exe, which poses as legitimate software to trick Windows users into launching it. Researchers said the infection uses a four-stage loader chain that starts with a Delphi application disguised as AGE Flash Player, reconstructs encrypted code, manually maps later components into memory, and ultimately launches the MainDll.Dll payload, reducing visible artifacts and helping evade file-based detection.
Once installed, AtlasRAT gives attackers remote control of infected systems through encrypted command-and-control using TLS and ChaCha20. The malware can run plugins, capture keystrokes, inspect processes, download and execute files, and inject code into WeChat.Exe. A persistence module, Persistence86.Dll, can tamper with the Windows BITS database, use NTUSER.MAN for logon persistence, and attempt UAC bypass through registry hijacking and CMSTPLUA. Investigators also identified a self-signed certificate with the subject CN=update.Microsoft.Com, along with related file artifacts, mutexes, protocol strings, network indicators, PDB paths, and sample hashes for detection.
Pull IOCs and campaign context straight into your stack.
1 event from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
ASEC reported a malware campaign distributing AtlasRAT through a fake Flash Player installer named FlashPlay.Exe. The report described a four-stage in-memory loader chain, Microsoft-themed self-signed certificate abuse, persistence and UAC-bypass techniques, and published indicators of compromise.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.
Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 18 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.
Pull the IOCs, campaigns, and victimology behind this family, ready to push into your SIEM and EDR.
3 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
malwarebytes.com
Open sourcecybersecuritynews.com
Open sourcecryptika.com
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Researchers detailed previously unreported **AtlasRAT** tradecraft, describing a four-stage loader chain that runs entirely in memory and is designed to minimize disk activity and evade detection. The infection sequence begins with a Delphi executable disguised as **AGE Flash Player**, then loads an encrypted Stage 2 PE, reconstructs downloader shellcode, and ultimately launches a 32-bit RAT, `MainDll.Dll`, through `ServiceRun`. The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure including `150.158.50.175:443`, using a `BFuck\0\0\0` handshake before shifting to **ChaCha20-encrypted** traffic over TLS. Researchers said AtlasRAT supports modular code execution, offline keylogging, inventory collection for 33 security-product executables, and DLL injection into **WeChat**, and they have tracked **43** AtlasRAT C2 servers since June 9, 2026; the operators and developers remain unidentified, though the malware may have been distributed commercially or through private channels.
Jul 15, 2026
A malware campaign is using fake Microsoft Teams download pages promoted on **X** to lure corporate users into installing trojanized ZIP archives that deploy **ValleyRAT**. Researchers said the infection chain relies on an **NSIS** installer and **DLL sideloading** through Tencent’s legitimate `GameBox.exe`, then uses PowerShell to add Windows Defender exclusions, hide files, and establish persistence through unauthorized service creation and registry artifacts including `_CCGDAT`. Once executed, the loader decrypts staged payloads from `user.dat` in memory using **AES** and **XOR**, with additional evasion through API hashing and reflective loading. The final ValleyRAT payload captures keystrokes, clipboard contents, and active-window activity before exfiltrating data to command-and-control infrastructure at `103.215.77.17`; researchers said the campaign shows Chinese-language artifacts and behavioral overlaps that likely tie it to the **SilverFox APT** cluster.
Jun 30, 2026
Multiple active malware campaigns are delivering **remote access trojans (RATs)** using deceptive lures and multi-stage execution chains designed to evade endpoint defenses. Malwarebytes reported a campaign dubbed **DEAD#VAX** that distributes a file masquerading as a “PDF” but actually delivered as a **virtual hard disk (`.vhd`)** hosted via **IPFS**; when opened, Windows mounts the VHD and the victim is tricked into launching a **Windows Script File (`.wsf`)** that ultimately deploys **AsyncRAT**. The chain includes anti-analysis checks and **process injection** into Microsoft-signed binaries such as `RuntimeBroker.exe`, `OneDrive.exe`, `taskhostw.exe`, and `sihost.exe`, enabling hands-on-keyboard remote control while minimizing obvious on-disk artifacts. Separately, reporting described **DesckVB RAT v2.9**, a modular **.NET** RAT using an obfuscated **WSH JavaScript** stager followed by **PowerShell**-based anti-analysis checks and an in-memory (“fileless”) loader, emphasizing persistence and a plugin-based architecture for post-compromise capabilities. Another campaign distributes **ValleyRAT** disguised as a legitimate *LINE* installer, targeting **Chinese-speaking users**; it attempts to weaken defenses by using PowerShell to add broad **Windows Defender exclusions**, performs sandbox checks (e.g., mutex/file-locking behaviors), and uses advanced injection (reported as **PoolParty Variant 7** via Windows I/O completion ports) to hide within trusted processes while stealing credentials and maintaining C2 communications.
Jun 29, 2026