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FIN7 Revamped JSSLoader Campaign Uses Excel Add-ins for Initial Access

Malware Intelligence · 6 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 14, 2022

FIN7 Revamped JSSLoader Campaign Uses Excel Add-ins for Initial Access

FIN7 has continued to evolve its malware delivery and post-compromise tooling, with multiple reports tying the group to campaigns that use malicious Excel add-ins (.xll) to deliver a rewritten JSSLoader. Malwarebytes reported a late-June malspam operation in which an XLL component launched JSSLoader and dropped a secondary .NET payload, while later reporting from Morphisec and Secureworks also linked new JSSLoader activity to Excel add-ins. Researchers said the newer JSSLoader variants expand on earlier versions with added functionality, including enhanced data-exfiltration capabilities.

The activity fits a broader pattern in FIN7 intrusions documented by Mandiant, which showed the group shifting from older loaders such as LOADOUT and GRIFFON toward more flexible access tools including POWERPLANT and Cobalt Strike BEACON, while continually rewriting malware to evade detection. Mandiant also described FIN7 using compromised RDP credentials, shellcode loaders, reconnaissance, Kerberoasting, and customized backdoors, underscoring that the latest JSSLoader delivery chain is part of a longer-running effort by the financially motivated group to refine initial access, persistence, and follow-on intrusion capability.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

6 events · Aug 2020 – Aug 14, 2022
  1. Aug 14, 20224y ago

    Malwarebytes identifies rewritten JSSLoader with exfiltration

    In its analysis of the late-June campaign, Malwarebytes determined that FIN7 was using another rewrite of JSSLoader with expanded capabilities. The newly observed version included data exfiltration functions, and one analyzed sample dropped a secondary .NET payload during execution.

    JSSLoader: The Shellcode Edition | ThreatDown
  2. Jun 2022

    Malwarebytes observes late-June FIN7 malspam campaign

    Malwarebytes observed a malspam campaign in late June and attributed it to FIN7. The attack chain used an XLL component as an initial step leading to JSSLoader.

    JSSLoader: The Shellcode Edition | ThreatDown
  3. Apr 4, 20225y ago

    Mandiant documents FIN7 tradecraft evolution

    Mandiant published research describing FIN7’s evolution from 2020 through 2021, including its move away from LOADOUT and GRIFFON toward POWERPLANT and BEACON. The report also highlighted distinctive PowerShell execution patterns and a 2021 intrusion case involving TERMITE and victim-customized POWERPLANT.

    FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7 | Mandiant | Google Cloud Blog
  4. Mar 24, 20225y ago

    Morphisec reports stealthier JSSLoader via Excel add-ins

    Morphisec Labs reported a new JSSLoader campaign linked to FIN7 that used phishing emails with malicious Excel XLL or XLM add-ins to download and execute the payload. The updated malware added stronger obfuscation, including renamed functions and runtime string concatenation, to hinder static and endpoint detection.

    Malicious Microsoft Excel add-ins used to deliver RAT malware
  5. Apr 2021

    FIN7 activity uptick begins across five intrusions

    Mandiant identified an uptick in FIN7-suspected activity during 2021 across five intrusions beginning in April 2021. In these intrusions, FIN7 shifted away from earlier loaders toward direct deployment of POWERPLANT and Cobalt Strike BEACON.

    FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7 | Mandiant | Google Cloud Blog
  6. Aug 2020

    FIN7 first observed using POWERPLANT

    Mandiant reported that FIN7 was first observed using the POWERPLANT PowerShell backdoor in late summer 2020. It was initially delivered after successful GRIFFON infections, with August 2020 specifically noted for this delivery pattern.

    FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7 | Mandiant | Google Cloud Blog
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