njRAT Campaigns Spread Through Macros, Paste Sites, Web Downloads, and npm Packages
Malware Intelligence · 9 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Sep 2, 2023

Researchers across multiple reports documented continued njRAT (also known as Bladabindi) activity delivered through diverse infection chains, including malicious PowerPoint macros, phishing attachments, password-protected archives, trojanized software on Korean webhard sites, compiled AutoHotKey loaders, and typosquatted npm packages. The malware was shown using layered obfuscation in VBS and PowerShell, Base64-encoded payloads, reflective or in-memory loading, and staged retrieval from services such as paste.ee, archive.org, wtools.io, and dynamic DNS infrastructure. In one supply-chain case, the npm packages jdb.js and db-json.js installed a .NET payload that copied itself as dchps.exe and connected to 46.185.116.2:5552, while other campaigns used domains including fidapeste2.duckdns.org, xxxcarldon.duckdns.org, and 0.tcp.eu.ngrck.io for command and control.
Analysis of multiple samples showed njRAT maintaining persistence through Startup folder copies, registry Run keys, shortcuts, mutexes, firewall-rule changes, and even netsh exclusions, while some variants bundled legitimate applications so victims would not notice the infection. Once active, the RAT collected host profiling data and supported a broad set of attacker functions, including keylogging, credential theft, webcam access, screenshot and screen viewing, file transfer, process and registry manipulation, remote shell access, and full remote control of Windows systems. Reports also linked njRAT delivery to long-running loader ecosystems that rotated payload families such as Houdini, LimeRAT, RevengeRAT, AsyncRAT, and VjW0rm, underscoring the malware’s persistence as a flexible commodity RAT used across phishing, malware-hosting, and software supply-chain abuse.


