Attackers Shift to LNK, ISO, and HTML Smuggling to Deliver QakBot and Other Malware
Malware Intelligence · 5 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Jan 19, 2023

Threat actors increasingly replaced macro-enabled Office documents with Windows shortcut (.LNK) files, ISO images, and HTML smuggling to gain initial access on Windows systems after Microsoft tightened macro protections and as adversaries sought ways around Mark-of-the-Web controls, including CVE-2022-41049. Fortinet reported phishing campaigns in 2022 delivering Emotet, Qbot/QakBot, IcedID, and Bumblebee through Excel 4.0 macros early on, then shifting to LNK files, ISO containers, and browser-reconstructed payloads that launched malware via native tools such as
powershell
mshta.exe
regsvr32.exe
rundll32.exe
curl
cmd.exe
A separate Fortinet investigation detailed a QakBot campaign in which an attached HTML file dropped a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK that fetched a loader DLL and executed the core malware filelessly inside a hollowed process.
Cisco Talos found that the growing use of malicious LNK files also created a forensic trail: embedded metadata such as Drive Serial Number, MachineID, DROID GUIDs, timestamps, paths, and SIDs can link campaigns and expose the systems used to build the shortcuts. Talos used Qakbot and Gamaredon examples to show how LNK metadata supports clustering and hunting, and identified metadata-based ties between Bumblebee, IcedID, and Qakbot, suggesting shared tooling or operational overlap. Earlier Fortinet reporting showed LNK-based phishing was already being used in espionage operations, including a campaign targeting Ukrainian government entities with ZIP archives containing malicious shortcuts, reinforcing that LNK files had become a versatile delivery mechanism for both financially motivated malware and state-linked intrusion activity.


