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Iranian MuddyWater Expanded Middle East Espionage With New MuddyC2Go Framework

Threat Actor Intelligence · 8 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Nov 8, 2023

Iranian MuddyWater Expanded Middle East Espionage With New MuddyC2Go Framework

Security researchers and government analysts said the Iranian state-linked MuddyWater group continued broad cyberespionage operations across the Middle East and nearby regions while evolving its malware and command-and-control infrastructure. Recent reporting tied the actor to a previously unreported Go-based C2 framework, MuddyC2Go, which appears to have replaced older PhonyC2 infrastructure after source code leaks and has been active since at least 2020. Campaigns linked to the framework targeted a Jordanian company, an Iraqi telecommunications provider, and likely Israeli organizations, while earlier activity hit government, telecom, and intergovernmental entities in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Pakistan, and other regional states through spearphishing, malicious archives, macro-enabled Office files, PDFs, and PowerShell-heavy loaders.

Across multiple campaigns, MuddyWater used a shifting toolset that included POWGOOP, Canopy/Starwhale, Mori, ForeLord, POWERSTATS, Covicli, lightweight VBS first-stage malware, DNS-tunneling RATs, ASP.NET web shells, and tunneling utilities such as SSF and Ligolo. Analysts also linked the group to exploitation of CVE-2020-0688 and possible use of CVE-2020-1472 in operations against Israeli targets, including an intrusion assessed as potentially destructive through deployment of PowGoop and a Thanos-based wiper-like payload disguised as ransomware. Despite changes in malware families and infrastructure, reports consistently described the actor as relying heavily on PowerShell, credential theft, persistence via registry keys or scheduled tasks, and rapidly changing C2 servers, underscoring a sustained Iranian espionage capability with occasional escalation toward disruptive effects.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

18 events · 2019 – Nov 8, 2023
  1. Nov 8, 20233y ago

    Deep Instinct publicly reports MuddyC2Go framework

    On November 8, 2023, Deep Instinct published research on a previously unreported Go-based command-and-control framework it named MuddyC2Go and attributed to MuddyWater. The report said the group appeared to have shifted from PhonyC2 to MuddyC2Go and linked historical and recent infrastructure across multiple campaigns.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  2. Oct 11, 20233y ago

    Possible MuddyWater attack on Israeli target detected

    On October 11, 2023, Deep Instinct identified a VirusTotal scan from Israel of a unique MuddyC2Go URL that returned PowerShell. The company assessed the scan likely indicated a recent MuddyWater attack against an Israeli target using C2 IP 94.131.109[.]65.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  3. Sep 2023

    MuddyWater targets Iraqi telecom provider Korek

    In September 2023, Deep Instinct identified additional PowerGUI-built executables distributed in password-protected RAR archives uploaded from Iraq. The activity was linked to attacks against Korek, an Iraqi-Kurdish telecommunications provider, using the hostname ghostrider.serveirc[.]com.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  4. Jul 2023

    Deep Instinct identifies Jordanian attack using offtec.exe

    In July 2023, Deep Instinct identified an executable named offtec.exe in an attack against a Jordanian company. The PowerGUI-built sample executed embedded PowerShell that connected to MuddyC2Go server 45.150.64[.]239 before switching to microsoftfice.ddns[.]net.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  5. Apr 2022

    MuddyC2Go hosted on 141.95.177[.]130

    Deep Instinct said IP address 141.95.177[.]130 hosted MuddyC2Go in April 2022 and resolved via passive DNS to jbf1.nc1310022a[.]biz. The naming pattern matched one previously seen with PhonyC2 servers.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  6. Mar 2022

    MuddyC2Go activity observed on CISA-listed MuddyWater IP

    Deep Instinct linked IP address 164.132.237[.]65, previously included by CISA as a MuddyWater indicator, to MuddyC2Go activity observed in March 2022. This connected the newer Go-based C2 framework to already attributed MuddyWater infrastructure.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  7. Feb 24, 20225y ago

    CISA and partners release MuddyWater malware analysis report

    On February 24, 2022, CISA, the FBI, NSA, NCSC-UK, and U.S. Cyber Command CNMF released a malware analysis report covering 23 MuddyWater-attributed files. The report detailed POWGOOP, JavaScript PowerShell beacons, the Mori backdoor, and Canopy/Starwhale Excel lures.

    MAR-10369127-1.v1 - MuddyWater | CISA
  8. Jan 31, 20225y ago

    Talos publishes report on MuddyWater targeting Turkish users

    On January 31, 2022, Cisco Talos published findings on MuddyWater campaigns targeting Turkish users with malicious PDFs and executables. The reporting tied the activity to the Iranian APT and its use of phishing and malware delivery chains.

    Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables
  9. Nov 2021

    MuddyWater launches two campaigns against Turkey

    Cisco Talos said MuddyWater attempted two campaigns against Turkey in November 2021. Talos linked the activity to the group's broader use of phishing, PowerShell-based tooling, and SloughRAT-related tradecraft.

    MuddyWater targets Middle Eastern and Asian countries in phishing attacks - TechRepublic
  10. Jun 2021

    MuddyWater targets Armenia with similar executables

    Cisco Talos reported that MuddyWater targeted Armenia in June 2021 using Windows executable files similar to those seen in other campaigns. Talos presented this as part of broader 2021 regional activity by the group.

    MuddyWater targets Middle Eastern and Asian countries in phishing attacks - TechRepublic
  11. Apr 2021

    MuddyWater attacks Pakistan with PowerShell and document lures

    Cisco Talos observed a MuddyWater attack against Pakistan in April 2021. One delivery chain used a PowerShell-based downloader that accepted PS1 commands from C2, while another used a malicious court-themed document.

    MuddyWater targets Middle Eastern and Asian countries in phishing attacks - TechRepublic
  12. Sep 2020

    Operation Quicksand targets Israeli organizations

    ClearSky reported that during September 2020 it identified Operation Quicksand, a MuddyWater-attributed campaign targeting many prominent Israeli organizations. The operation used malicious documents and exploitation of Microsoft Exchange CVE-2020-0688, and ClearSky assessed it as MuddyWater's first known potentially destructive campaign.

    Clearsky Blog
  13. 2020

    MuddyWater begins long-running VBS stager campaign

    Lab52 said a MuddyWater campaign using compressed archives, malicious Word documents, VBA macros, and a lightweight VBS RAT had been active since the last quarter of 2020. Researchers collected samples dated from November 2020 through January 2022 targeting countries across the Middle East and nearby regions.

    MuddyWater’s “light” first-stager targeting Middle East
  14. Jan 2020

    Secureworks reports ongoing MuddyWater espionage through mid-January

    Secureworks reported that Iranian state-linked MuddyWater activity continued through mid-January 2020 with spearphishing campaigns and a previously unobserved RAT dubbed ForeLord. The firm said it had not observed government-directed cyber retaliation tied to regional tensions as of its reporting.

    Business as Usual For Iranian Operations Despite Increased Tensions | SOPHOS
  15. Jan 2020

    MuddyC2Go infrastructure appears in public scans

    Deep Instinct said IP address 109.201.140[.]103 showed unique MuddyC2Go URLs in scans from January 2020, including one from Egypt. The company assessed MuddyWater may have been using the Go-based framework since at least 2020.

    MuddyC2Go - Latest C2 Framework Used by Iranian APT MuddyWater Spotted in Israel | Deep Instinct Blog
  16. Apr 2019

    Telegram leaks expose alleged MuddyWater operational data

    In April 2019, Telegram leaks exposed alleged MuddyWater C2 backends, source code, and victim lists. Trend Micro assessed the leaked material was likely based on real MuddyWater operational data after comparing it with independently observed backend code and victim communications.

    Trendmicro Documents
  17. 2019

    Trend Micro documents POWERSTATS v3 in 2019 campaigns

    Trend Micro reported that first-half 2019 MuddyWater campaigns used compromised email accounts and a new multi-stage PowerShell backdoor called POWERSTATS v3. The infection chain used malicious macros, encoded VBE files, and staged PowerShell payloads disguised with image-like extensions.

    Trendmicro Documents
  18. 2019

    MuddyWater-linked spearphishing campaigns run across regional targets

    Secureworks observed espionage-focused spearphishing campaigns by COBALT ULSTER/MuddyWater between mid-2019 and mid-January 2020 targeting government organizations in Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as entities in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Trend Micro also attributed first-half 2019 campaigns against a Jordanian university and the Turkish government to MuddyWater.

    Business as Usual For Iranian Operations Despite Increased Tensions | SOPHOS
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Cellcom Fixed Line Communication L.PKorek TelecomOfftec

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