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BPFDoor and AVERAT Mimic Email Security Appliances to Hide Linux Backdoors

Malware Intelligence · 8 sources · Updated 1mo ago · First seen Oct 2, 2026

BPFDoor and AVERAT Mimic Email Security Appliances to Hide Linux Backdoors

Rapid7 identified two overlapping Linux malware campaigns targeting South Korean and Taiwanese telecom and network-edge email security environments. One uses BPFDoor variants and a BPF-enabled Rekoobe backdoor to impersonate South Korean SpamSniper anti-spam software and legitimate background processes. The other targets Taiwanese ShareTech appliances with a vendor-oriented dropper and AVERAT, a newly identified remote-access tool analyzed across six builds. Appliance-specific masquerading, passive packet triggers, and SMTP-disguised communications over TCP port 25 help the implants evade detection, particularly on secure email gateways with limited endpoint visibility and difficult-to-baseline outbound mail traffic.

The Taiwanese deployment chain launches AVERAT and a resident watchdog, then deletes their staged executables while the processes remain active. AVERAT supports remote shells, file operations, module loading, proxying, and configurable command-and-control through compromised Taiwanese consumer and small-business appliances. The relay infrastructure resembles operational relay box networks described in China-nexus advisories, but Rapid7 found no evidence establishing membership in a named network or definitive actor attribution. Recommended detection priorities include unexpected raw packet sockets and BPF filters, deleted executable mappings, appliance-specific staging artifacts, and outbound port-25 connections originating from non-mail processes.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

4 events
  1. Reported Oct 2, 20262mo ago

    Rapid7 identifies compromised Taiwanese devices serving as AVERAT relays

    Rapid7 traced three AVERAT relay addresses to a fuel retailer's Synology NAS, an obsolete SMB appliance, and a Dahua recorder on Chunghwa Telecom's network; all exposed PPTP with an identical fingerprint. Researchers assessed the devices as SMTP-disguised relays and VPN footholds but found no indicator overlap establishing membership in a named relay network or definitive actor attribution.

    SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge
  2. Reported Oct 2, 20262mo ago

    Rapid7 uncovers AVERAT and a ShareTech-oriented deployment chain

    Rapid7 examined six AVERAT builds targeting Taiwanese appliances and reconstructed a ShareTech-oriented installer that launches the backdoor and a watchdog before deleting their staged executables while the processes remain active. AVERAT disguises encrypted command-and-control as SMTP traffic and supports remote shells, file operations, module loading, and proxying.

    SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge
  3. Reported Oct 2, 20262mo ago

    Researchers identify BPFDoor and Rekoobe variants targeting South Korean appliances

    Rapid7 analyzed Linux implants that impersonate SpamSniper software and legitimate background processes on South Korean telecom and email-security systems. The analysis revealed passive BPF packet triggers, shell-access functionality, and a Rekoobe reverse shell disguised as a SpamSniper service using TCP port 25.

    SMTP is the key: BPFDoor and AVERAT hitting the network edge
  4. Reported Jun 8, 20266mo ago

    Sygnia reports Velvet Ant’s Operation Highland intrusion

    Sygnia reported on Operation Highland, in which the China-nexus actor Velvet Ant infiltrated an internal network undetected.

    Velvet Ant's Operation Highland: How a China-Nexus Actor Infiltrated an Internal Network Undetected
Linked entities

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Threat actors

1 linked

Affected products

1 linked
Spamsniper

Organizations

2 linked
ShareTechShareTech Information

Observables

18 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 18 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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