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Malware19 associated CVEs

Evooo1Bot

Tracked since Aug 13, 2026 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns19Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingPersistenceInitial accessLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionScanningBrute forceDDOS
Platforms
LinuxNetwork deviceIOT

Evooo1Bot is a modular, Mirai-derived Linux botnet observed targeting internet-facing systems across multiple regions since July 2026. It compromises routers, gateways, and other edge devices through known vulnerabilities and weak SSH credentials. Observed exploitation has targeted products from Alcatel, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare, and D-Link. An architecture-aware loader retrieves and executes a matching Linux payload, with 12 architecture-specific variants identified.

The malware combines Mirai’s DDoS engine with encrypted command-and-control communications, SSH brute-force scanning, credential interception, remote administration, and direct and reverse SOCKS5 proxying. Its proxy module routes attacker traffic through compromised devices to conceal its origin, bypass geographic restrictions, and provide access to internal networks reachable from infected systems. A sniffer captures HTTP Basic Authentication and Cookie headers. Operators can execute an interactive shell, transfer files, retrieve system information, update the malware, and dispatch additional exploitation attempts. Its DDoS capabilities include UDP, DNS, TCP, and GRE floods, alongside customizable HTTP flooding.

Evooo1Bot supports persistence through systemd services, SysV initialization scripts, scheduled tasks, and shell startup modifications. Defense-evasion measures include clearing shell history, layered string obfuscation using AES-256-CTR, ChaCha20, and XOR, and checks for analysis tools, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers, and honeypots. Its SSH scanner uses more than 150 credential entries and performs additional honeypot checks after successful authentication. Newer builds expose a 28-command administration interface and an embedded exploit dispatcher targeting networking products and enterprise applications. Some embedded exploit entries are incorrectly implemented and cannot exploit their claimed targets as shipped.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

19 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-1389via fortinet threat research blogUnauthenticated Root Command Injection in TP-Link Archer AX21CVE-2023-1389 TP-Link Archer AX21 /cgi-bin/luci/;stok=/locale | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-55583via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildUnauthenticated OS command injection in D-Link DIR-868L B1CVE-2025-55583: D-Link DIR-868L B1 router Command Injection Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-36260via fortinet threat research blogUnauthenticated Remote Command Injection in Hikvision Surveillance DevicesCVE-2021-36260 Hikvision IP Camera /SDK/webLanguage | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-6277via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildRemote OS command injection in NETGEAR routersCVE-2016-6277: NETGEAR Multiple Routers Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-10123via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildCommand Injection in D-Link DIR-823X DHCP Static Lease ConfigurationCVE-2025-10123, D-Link DIR-823X Command Injection Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-1974via fortinet threat research blogIngressNightmare: Unauthenticated RCE in Kubernetes ingress-nginxCVE-2025-1974 Kubernetes ingress-nginx /apis/networking/v1/ingresses | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2019-14931via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildUnauthenticated OS command injection in Mitsubishi Electric and INEA ME-RTUCVE-2019-14931: Mitsubishi Electric Europe B.V. ME-RTU devices and INEA ME-RTU devices remote Command Injection vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-29269via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Telesquare TLR-2005KSHCVE-2024-29269, Telesquare TLR-2005KSH Command Injection Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-4577via fortinet threat research blogPHP-CGI Argument Injection on WindowsCVE-2024-4577 PHP-CGI (Windows) allow_url_include%3D | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-30525via fortinet threat research blogOS Command Injection in Zyxel Firewall CGI HandlerCVE-2022-30525 Zyxel Firewall /ztp/cgi-bin/handler | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2007-3010via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildRemote command injection in Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Unified Maintenance ToolCVE-2007-3010: Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-10987via fortinet threat research blogExploited in the wildOS Command Injection in Tenda AC15 AC1900 RoutersCVE-2020-10987: Tenda AC1900 Router AC15 Model Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | FortiGuard Labs has been tracking a previously undocumented Linux botnet family, which we have named Evooo1Bot. The name derives from the hardcoded string “evooo1” found in every binary.View vulnerability →Source ↗

7 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

and a “sniffer” that looks for default access credentials that haven’t been changed since a device was put into service

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence9

Для первоначального заражения ботнет эксплуатирует известные уязвимости в устройствах Alcatel, Netgear, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare и D-Link.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence7

Дополнительно создается cron-задача, которая каждые пять минут пытается повторно скачать пейлоад.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

Supported commands allow an operator to install persistence mechanisms, update the binary, terminate the bot, upload/download files, launch an interactive shell

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence9

операторы ботнета могут открыть интерактивный шелл на зараженном хосте

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

Newer builds have been found with modules targeting Hikvision cameras, Atlassian Confluence, Zyxel firewalls, TP-Link routers, D-Link NAS devices, WSO2 products, Kubernetes ingress-nginx and vulnerable PHP-CGI installations.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence4

Для закрепления в системе малварь использует systemd, SysV init, shell-профили и rc.local.

T1053.003CronEvidence7

Дополнительно создается cron-задача, которая каждые пять минут пытается повторно скачать пейлоад.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

and a “sniffer” that looks for default access credentials that haven’t been changed since a device was put into service

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence6

Для закрепления в системе малварь использует systemd

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Evooo1Bot поддржува голем број команди кои му овозможуваат на операторот: да инсталира механизми за перзистентност

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

Once installed, Evooo1Bot can establish encrypted command-and-control (C2) communications over TCP port 442 and execute commands and maintain persistence through multiple mechanisms, including the systemd service, cron jobs, shell profiles, and other methods.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence4

Для закрепления в системе малварь использует systemd, SysV init, shell-профили и rc.local.

T1053.003CronEvidence7

Дополнительно создается cron-задача, которая каждые пять минут пытается повторно скачать пейлоад.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

and a “sniffer” that looks for default access credentials that haven’t been changed since a device was put into service

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence6

Для закрепления в системе малварь использует systemd

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence2

Evooo1Bot поддржува голем број команди кои му овозможуваат на операторот: да инсталира механизми за перзистентност

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

Les chaînes statiques sont protégées par un pipeline multi-couches : Chiffrement AES-256-CTR et ChaCha20 ... Encodage XOR supplémentaire

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Bash history is cleared post-infection.

T1070.003Clear Command HistoryEvidence7

После этого скрипт очищает историю Bash, чтобы скрыть следы атаки.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

After gaining initial access through one of its exploit modules or via brute-forced SSH credentials, the bot runs a loader script that clears Bash history to erase evidence of the intrusion

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

and a “sniffer” that looks for default access credentials that haven’t been changed since a device was put into service

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

T1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (Defense Evasion)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence10

Перед запуском малварь проверяет систему на наличие отладчиков, средств защиты, песочниц, виртуальных машин, контейнеров и ханипотов.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The scanner issues the following command over the established session: cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null; echo ---; cat /proc/1/cmdline 2>/dev/null; ls /opt/cowrie /home/cowrie /home/kippo 2>/dev/null

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

It searches for debuggers, security software, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers and honeypots...

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

Once installed, Evooo1Bot can establish encrypted command-and-control (C2) communications over TCP port 442 and execute commands and maintain persistence through multiple mechanisms, including the systemd service, cron jobs, shell profiles, and other methods.

Credential Access

8 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence8

intercept HTTP Basic Authorization and Cookie headers

T1110Brute ForceEvidence10

Еще один компонент отвечает за брутфорс SSH и перебирает 150 комбинаций имен пользователей и паролей

T1110.001Password GuessingEvidence3

SSH brute-force scanner module Used to compromise additional devices via weak SSH credentials

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence4

отдельный модуль Evooo1Bot отслеживает /proc/net/tcp и пытается перехватывать заголовки Authorization с данными Basic-аутентификации, а также заголовки cookie.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

The credential sniffer intercepts authentication headers in transit, so any HTTP Basic Auth credentials passing through an infected device can be captured without any additional effort from the operator.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Sniffer !sniff Lecture /proc/net/tcp , capture HTTP Basic Auth et cookies → /tmp/.sniff.log

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Sniffer !sniff !stopsniff Reads /proc/net/tcp, intercepts HTTP Basic Authorization and Cookie headers, and writes to /tmp/.sniff.log

T1556.004Network Device AuthenticationEvidence1

Once installed, Evooo1Bot can establish encrypted command-and-control (C2) communications over TCP port 442 and execute commands and maintain persistence through multiple mechanisms, including the systemd service, cron jobs, shell profiles, and other methods.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence8

intercept HTTP Basic Authorization and Cookie headers

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Evooo1Bot’s features include encrypted communications with command-and-control servers; a scanner that looks for Secure Shell (SSH) code and skips devices clearly set up as honeypots for malicious traffic

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Control !kill !exit !info Terminate bot, exit gracefully, or return system info

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

Supported commands allow an operator to install persistence mechanisms, update the binary, terminate the bot, upload/download files, launch an interactive shell

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence10

Перед запуском малварь проверяет систему на наличие отладчиков, средств защиты, песочниц, виртуальных машин, контейнеров и ханипотов.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The scanner issues the following command over the established session: cat /proc/version 2>/dev/null; echo ---; cat /proc/1/cmdline 2>/dev/null; ls /opt/cowrie /home/cowrie /home/kippo 2>/dev/null

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

It searches for debuggers, security software, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers and honeypots...

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence6

After gaining initial access through one of its exploit modules or via brute-forced SSH credentials

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

Supported commands allow an operator to install persistence mechanisms, update the binary, terminate the bot, upload/download files, launch an interactive shell

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence7

Если все «чисто», Evooo1Bot устанавливает зашифрованное соединение с управляющим сервером через порт 443, маскируя свой трафик под обычный HTTPS.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

T1071.001 — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (Command and Control)

T1090ProxyEvidence7

Малварь атакует доступные через интернет роутеры, файрволы, IP-камеры и другие пограничные устройства, превращая их в SOCKS5-прокси.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

T1090.001 — Proxy: Internal Proxy (Command and Control)

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

T1090.002 — Proxy: External Proxy (Command and Control)

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence5

The proxy component transforms an infected router, firewall, IP camera, or other edge device into a SOCKS5 proxy that the threat actor can leverage as a network relay to conduct follow-on operations and evade detection.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence10

После успешной эксплуатации какого-либо бага на устройство загружается скрипт wget.sh, который определяет архитектуру процессора и скачивает подходящий вариант Evooo1Bot

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence6

before establishing encrypted communications with a command-and-control (C2) server on port 443, a deliberate choice intended to blend in with expected HTTPS traffic at the network perimeter.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

операторы ботнета могут открыть интерактивный шелл на зараженном хосте, что позволит им загружать и скачивать файлы

Impact

2 techniques
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence9

Наконец, от Mirai Evooo1Bot унаследовал DDoS-модуль, который поддерживает 16 вариантов флуда

T1499Endpoint Denial of ServiceEvidence4

The bot borrows Mirai’s DDoS engine... After establishing C2 contact, the bot accepts commands covering the full post-compromise toolkit... DDoS over DNS, TCP, and UDP

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
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Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities19CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.